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The action taken by the United Nations (U.N.) against Iraq for its
occupation of Kuwait last year contrasts starkly with the U.N. action
taken against Israel for its occupation of the Arab Territories' during
and after the 1967 war.2 The difference can partly be explained by the
protection that the United States, as a permanent member of the Security
Council, provides to Israel.3 Furthermore, there is a perception in the
United States and in Europe that the two situations differed: Israel had
acted in self-defense while Iraq had not.4 The fact that the U.N. Security
Council found Iraq guilty of aggression in its occupation of Kuwait5 lent
a sense of urgency to the situation which was lacking with respect to the
Israeli occupation. If the Security Council had found Israel responsible
for aggressive acts immediately following its invasion of the Arab
Territories, it would likely have moved with greater dispatch to secure
Israel's withdrawal. Even today, if the Security Council determined that
* Professor of Law, Ohio State University. LL.B., M.A. 1966, Harvard Law School.
1. For the purposes of this article, the Arab Territories include the Gaza Strip, the Golan
Heights, the Sinai Peninsula, and the West Bank.
2. With Israel's invasion, the U.N. made no finding of aggression. The Security Council
and the General Assembly did call on Israel to withdraw from the Arab Territories occupied
in the 1967 six day war. S.C. Res. 476, U.N. SCOR, 35th Sess. at 13, U.N. Doc. S/INF/36 (1980);
G.A. Res. 3414, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975); S.C. Res.
242, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/INF/22/Rev.2 (1968). In demanding an Israeli
withdrawal, the U.N. did not find it necessary to decide whether Israel had acted aggressively.
Even when acting defensively, a state taking territory gains no sovereign rights, because it is
limited to force that is necessary to repel the aggression. Therefore, regardless of whether
either Iraq or Israel committed aggression in taking, respectively, Kuwait and the Arab
Territories, they had no right to remain. R.Y. JENNINGS, THE AcQusrrIoN oF TERRITORY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 55-56 (1963); W. THOMAS MALLISON & SALLY V. MALLSON, THE PALESTINE
PROBLEM IN IRqERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 259 (1986).
3. See, e.g., Israeli and Palestinian Affairs in Brief; PLO's Fariq Qaddumi on U.S. Veto of
Security Council Resolutions on Israeli Actions in Territories, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASIS,
Nov. 10, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Archiv. file (quoting PLO representative that
United States' veto of Security Council Resolutions condemning Israeli policy in the Occupied
Territories proves that the United States does not wish to deal with the Middle East crisis).
4. See infra notes 56, 65 and accompanying text.
5. S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990).
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Israel committed aggression in taking the Arab Territories, the case for
strong action in the U.N. would be more compelling.
The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, brought the
question of the Arab-Israeli dispute to the fore of international attention
when Iraq raised the issue of linkage: after it occupied Kuwait, Iraq
asserted that it would discuss withdrawing from Kuwait only in the
context of negotiations for Israel's withdrawal from the Arab Territories. 6
Linking the two events was appealing because it focused attention on the
Arab-Israeli dispute which has long been on the U.N. agenda.' More
importantly, it presented an opportunity to remove Iraq from Kuwait
without the use of military force,8 and to end the Israeli occupation of
the Gaza Strip, West Bank, and the Golan Heights. The General
Assembly, therefore, resolved to ask the Security Council "to convene
the International Peace Conference on the Middle East."9 While most
members of the Security Council agreed,"° the United States refused to
link the two issues and threatened to veto any Security Council
resolution that set a date for such a conference. " As a result,
Resolution 681, addressing the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, was silent on
the topic of a Middle East peace conference." Thus, the United States
precluded consideration of the Palestinian-Israeli issue in the context of
the Kuwaiti crisis.
After the Security Council adopted Resolution 678, which authorized
"all necessary means" to get Iraq out of Kuwait,3 President George
Bush announced that although Secretary of State James Baker would
hold talks with Iraq, he "[would] not be negotiating the Palestinian
question." 4 The Bush administration reasoned that any linkage would
6. Nick B. Williams, Jr., Baghdad Seeks to Tie Any Dialogue to 'Outstanding Issues in the
Arab Region,' Including Palestine. The U.S. Has Rejected Such a Linkage, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1990,
at Al.
7. S.C. Res. 242, supra note 2 (illustrating that the Security Council had debated the issue
as early as 1968).
8. Nora Boustany, Iraq Puts Conditions on Summit: Official Says Talks Must Deal with Arab-
Israeli Issue, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1990, at Al (saying diplomats think Iraq would withdraw
from Kuwait if it could gain progress towards an Israeli withdrawal).
9. G.A. Res. 68, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., 59th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 23, U.N. Doc.
A/45/L.27 & Add.1.
10. President Gorbachev favored a conference on both Iraqs occupation of Kuwait and
Israel's occupation of the Arab Territories. Jessica Lee, Soviets Balk at Use of Force; Bush at a Loss,
USA TODAY, Nov. 21, 1990, at A6 (Yemen, Cuba, Malaysia, and Colombia pushing for linking
the two occupations).
11. Question and Answer Session with Reporters in Santiago, Chile, 26 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 1989, 1992 (Dec. 6, 1990); Excerpts from President's News Conference on Crisis in Gulf,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1990, at A6. See also Standoff in the Gulf, U.N. Postpones Vote on Resolution,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1990, at A20 (vote on Gulf postponed while the Foreign Minister of the
former Soviet Union, Shevardnadze, discussed the U.S. veto threat with the chairman of the
Palestine Liberation Organization, Arafat).
12. S.C. Res. 681, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/681 (1990).
13. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990).
14. U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf- Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
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reward Iraq for its occupation of Kuwait, and that Iraq did not invade
Kuwait to settle the Palestinian question."
The Iraqi government characterized the United States' stance as a
propaganda ploy to excuse Israel's aggression against neighboring Arab
peoples and represented an effort to distract world attention from Israel's
occupation.16 The former Soviet Union also disagreed with the United
States. Then Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze pointed out
that the Security Council had been working on the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict for many years:
Why should we stop all this now? Are we in some strange way
intimidated by the word "linkage"? We believe that we should
continue what we have been doing and what we ought to be doing
now: seeking a path towards a comprehensive settlement of the whole
complex of Middle East problems that existed prior to 2 August. That
is not rewarding anyone; it is just sound policy and common sense.Y1
In an immediate sense, the military action taken against Iraq in 1991
rendered the linkage dispute moot. Since the end of the Gulf war,
efforts have been underway toward a Palestinian-Israeli settlement. 8
Still, the linkage issue retains its importance for two reasons. First, the
asserted differences between the two occupations are still raised as
objections to an Israeli withdrawal from the Arab Territories that it
occupied in 1967. Second, it appears that the U.N. has applied a double
standard by treating Iraq severely while issuing only verbal injunctions
to Israel.
This article argues that Israel, like Iraq, committed aggression, and
that the U.N. should have acted against Israel as severely and
expeditiously as it did against Iraq. The fact that Israel has been able to
maintain control of the Occupied Territories since 1967 does not diminish
the U.N. obligation to take necessary action. If Israel cannot be
convinced through negotiation to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and the
West Bank, the U.N. is obliged by the U.N. Charter to take economic and
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 107 (1990) (statement of Secretary Baker) [hereinafter U.S. Policy in the
Persian Gulf].
15. Secretary Baker's Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October17,1990,
and House Foreign Affairs Committee, October 18, 1990, FOREIGN POLY BULL., Nov.-Dec. 1990, at
43-44 ("He is not raping Kuwait to advance the Palestinian cause.").
16. 'Baghdad Observer' Says Middle East Conference Would Be 'Embarrassment' for USA,
BBC, Dec. 10, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni file).
17. Provisional Verbatim Record, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg. at 93, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.2963 (1990).
18. See, e.g., Thomas Friedman, After the War: Diplomacy; 8 Arab Countries Back Bush's Plan
on Mideast Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1991, at Al (reporting that eight Arab countries agreed
to the broad outline of President BusWs peace plan for the Middle East).
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diplomatic sanctions to force Israel out. 9 If such sanctions fail, then the
U.N. should apply military sanctions."
I. THE IRAQI RATIONALE FOR OCCUPYING KUWAIT
The Iraqi rationale for invading Kuwait originated from economic
and territorial claims. In the months preceding its 1990 invasion, Iraq
raised a number of commercial complaints against Kuwait.2' Kuwait
had loaned money to Iraq to support Iraq in its war with Iran and upon
which Iraq sought a waiver of repayment. Iraq argued that Kuwait had
profited at Iraq's expense by picking up Iraqi oil sales that had been
reduced by wartime destruction.' Furthermore, when the fighting
between Iran and Iraq finally ended, Kuwait, instead of cutting
production to let Iraq recoup some of its losses, pumped more oil than
the quota agreed upon in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC), helping to further drive down oil prices.' Iraq
suspected that by increasing production, Kuwait was seeking concessions
on outstanding territorial issues.24 Furthermore, during the Iran-Iraq
war Kuwait set up oil rigs in the buffer zone between Iraq and Kuwait,
a move that Iraq considered provocative.'
Iraq also sought improved access to the Gulf. As a result of the
borders drawn in the 1920s between Iraq and Kuwait, Iraqi territory is
connected to the Gulf only by a narrow stretch of water and thirty miles
of coastal marshland.' In order to provide improved access to the Gulf
and to allow it to better protect its short shoreline and port facilities, Iraq
claimed two uninhabited marshland islands that belonged to Kuwait -
Warbah and Bubiyan.2 During the spring of 1990, Kuwait refused to
make concessions on these territorial issues,2 telling King Hussein of
19. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-41 (authorizing the Security Council to determine threats to
the peace and to take appropriate action).
20. Id. art. 42.
21. Liesl Graz, Iraqi Sabres Rattle in the Gulf, MIDDLE EAST INT'L, Aug. 3, 1990, at 3.
22. Id.
23. G. Henry M. Schuler, Congress Must Take a Hard Look at Iraq's Charges Against Kuwait,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1990, at M4. In addition, Iraq claimed that Kuwait had taken oil that
belonged to Iraq from a pool which lay under the disputed Iraq-Kuwait border. Thomas C.
Hayes, The Oil ield Lying Below the Iraq-Kuwait Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1990, at A7.
24. Schuler, supra note 23, at M4.
25. Hayes, supra note 23, at A7.
26. Shaw J. Dallal, Has the United States Overreacted?, MIDDLE EAST INT'L, Oct. 12, 1990,
at 20,20; Majid Khadduri, Iraq's Claim to the Sovereignty of Kuwayt, 23 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
5, 26-28 (1990).
27. Khadduri, supra note 26, at 33.
28. Youssef M. Ibrahim, Iraq Seeks Bigger Role in OPEC, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1990, at DI;
Schuler, supra note 23, at M4 (noting Iraqi release of allegedly secret Kuwaiti report on U.S.-
Kuwaiti meetings in which the two agreed that Kuwait should pressure Iraq on the oil pricing
issue to get a good border settlement).
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Jordan that it was assured of United States intervention if Kuwait
experienced trouble with Iraq2
A. The Historical Dispute
Iraq's territorial claim is also a part of a larger historical dispute with
Kuwait. Until World War I, the region was part of the Ottoman Empire
and the people of present day Iraq had ready access to Gulf ports.'
However, in a 1915 secret pact (Sykes-Picot), France and Britain agreed
to create the states of Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan under British rule
and the states of Lebanon and Syria under French rule.' After
occupation by Britain and France, they became part of the League of
Nations mandate system2 Early in World War I, Britain promised
Kuwait its independence.'
Following the war, Britain did recognize Kuwaiti independence,
albeit under British protection.' From Iraq's perspective, the creation
of Kuwait as a state was disturbing because its effect was to deny Iraq
ready access to the Gulf. Britain divided the Gulf between Iran and
Kuwait; Iran received the eastern side of the Gulf, and Kuwait received
the western, leaving Iraq sandwiched in between the two. In addition,
if Iraq were to control Kuwait City - the on]. deep water port in the
Gulf - it would be preeminent in the region. Therefore, Iraq initially
refused to recognize Kuwaiti independence. 6  Iraq suspected that
29. Milton Viorst, The House of Hashem, NEW YORKER, Jan. 7, 1991, at 32, 43-44.
30. Current Documents: Gulf War Legal and Diplomatic Documents, 13 HOUS. J. INTL L. 281,
287 (1991) (document from the Iraqi Department of Information, Ministry of Information and
Culture entitled Kuwait and Its Historical and Legal Relations with Iraq) [hereinafter Current
Documents]; Khadduri, supra note 26, at 26.
31. See Correspondence Embodying Sykes-Picot Agreement, Apr. 26-Oct. 23, 1916, 4
DOcuMENTS ON BRITIsH FOREIGN POLICY 1919-1939, at 241-51 (1st ser. 1940). Britain had staked
a claim to Kuwait even before World War I. In the late nineteenth century, Kuwait was
administered from the Ottoman provincial center at Basra, which after World War I became
part of Iraq. In 1899, Britain was concerned that Germany might build a railway to Baghdad,
or that Russia might build one to Kuwait, threatening Britain's hold on India. To ensure its
control of the port of Kuwait, Britain concluded a secret agreement with Kuwait that bound
Kuwait not to receive the representative of any foreign power, or to cede or lease any of its
territory, without Britain's consent. Khadduri, supra note 26, at 11.
32. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22. Under the Mandate system, states taking
Ottoman territory were to administer their territory with accountability to the League.
33. Khadduri, supra note 26, at 23.
34. Id.
35. YAAcov SHIMONI, POLTICAL DIcTONARY OF THE ARAB WORLD 281 (1987).
36. Iraq finally recognized Kuwaiti independence in 1963. Agreed Minutes Between the
State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations,
Recognition and Related Matters, Oct. 4, 1963, 485 U.N.T.S. 326 ("[The Republic of Iraq
recognized the independence and complete sovereignty of the State of Kuwait...."); Khadduri,
supra note 26, at 30-31.
Spring 1992]
200 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 2:2
Britain wanted to prevent any single state from becoming too strong.37
Britain could thereby be assured of better access to the region's oil by
playing the states off against each other.'
Britain further restricted Iraq's access to the Gulf in 1923, when the
British High Commissioner of Iraq recognized Kuwaiti sovereignty over
the islands of Warbah and Bubiyan despite the fact that they had never
before belonged to Kuwait.39 The two islands lie on the Iraq-Kuwait
border and command the entrance to Um Qasr, an Iraqi port." The
action of the High Commissioner was never ratified formally by Iraq and
thus is not legally binding on Iraq." Even after Iraq became
independent in 1932, the two countries were unable to come to an
agreement on this mutual border. Kuwait continues to control the two
islands despite a British proposal that Kuwait lease Warbah, the smaller
of the two islands, to Iraq.'
B. The Invasion of Kuwait
In the summer of 1990, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein discussed
the border issue with the United States ambassador to Iraq, who
indicated that the United States did not have a position on Iraq's border
dispute with Kuwait.4' Kuwait showed little willingness to discuss the
border issue or Iraq's financial claims. It is possible that, had Kuwait
37. Current Documents, supra note 30, at 287.
38. Id.
39. Khadduri, supra note 26, at 27.
40. Id. Apart from the Gulf port of Um Qasr, the only other Iraqi city connected to the
Gulf is Basra, which is thirty miles inland from the Gulf up the Shatt al-Arab river. The river
has been a matter of constant dispute with Iran. Edmund Ghareeb, The Roots of Crisis: Iraq and
Iran, in THE PERSIAN GuLF WAR: LESSONS FOR STRATEGY, LAW, AND DipLOMAcY 21, 27
(Christopher C. Joyner ed., 1990); Raymond Habiby, Securing a Harbor: Iraqi-Iranian Relations
15 (paper presented at Center of Iranian Research & Analysis, Ann Arbor, Mich., Apr. 5-7,1991)
(on file with author). In the Iran-Iraq war that began in 1980, one of Iraqs first military
objectives was the capture of the eastern shore of the Shatt al-Arab. However, Iraq was never
able to gain complete control over the Shatt al-Arab, preventing the use of the port of Basra
throughout the entire decade of 1980s. Chaim Herzog, A Military-Strategic Overview, in THE
IRAN-IRAQ WAR: IMPACr AND IMPLICATIONS 255, 259-60 (Efraim Karsh ed., 1987).
Once the Iran-Iraq war ended, the two nations sparred over who would pay the cost of
dredging the Shatt al-Arab of the silt that had built up during the war and of clearing it of war
debris. Habiby, supra, at 15. When this issue was not readily resolved, Iraq decided to construct
a new waterway connecting Basra to the Gulf at Um Qasr, having concluded that this would
be less expensive. Id. at 16. However, access to the Gulf at Um Qasr was blocked by the
islands of Warbah and Bubiyan, leading Iraq to renew its claims to them and demand border
rectification around Urn Qasr. Khadduri, supra note 26, at 32; Habiby, supra, at 16.
41. Khadduri, supra note 26, at 28.
42. Id. at 29-30.
43. Current Documents, supra note 30, at 295 (excerpts from the Minutes of the Audience
Given by His Excellency President Saddam Hussein to Miss April Glaspie, the U.S. Ambassador
to Iraq, July 25, 1990, quoting Ambassador Glaspie telling President Hussein that the U.S. had
"no opinion" on "inter-Arab disputes, such as your border disagreement with Kuwait").
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agreed to formal or informal negotiations, the invasion might have been
avoided.'
However, on August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. At the time of
the invasion, Iraq announced the formation of a new government in
Kuwait that ceded to Iraq the two islands of Warbah and Bubiyan and
some territory around the port of Um Qasr.' This action suggested
that Iraq's initial goal may have been to get concessions on the two
islands and on the area around Um Qasr (as well as on its financial
claims) in exchange for a withdrawal from the rest of Kuwait.' It was
not until the United States airlifted troops into Saudi Arabia a few days
later that Iraq announced a "comprehensive and eternal merger" of
Kuwait into Iraq.' Iraq declared that the two islands and the border
area around Um Qasr would become a part of Basra province, while the
rest of Kuwait would form a new province of Iraq.' Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein said that "we are now one people, one state," and
Iraq's Revolutionary Command Council said it had decided to return
Kuwait to "the Iraq of its origins."49 The U.N. Security Council
condemned the annexation s
At this time, Iraq dropped its previous demand on Iran that the
clearing of the Shatt al-Arab river"1 should precede both an exchange
of prisoners still held from the Iran-Iraq war, 2 and Iraq's evacuation of
small portions of Iranian territory still held from the war.3 In a
reversal of policy, Iraq also agreed to recognize the validity of the 1975
agreement with Iran that specified the thalweg of the Shatt al-Arab as the
Iran-Iraq border.
44. U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf, supra note 14, at 164 (post-invasion proposal of former
National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski for binding arbitration of Kuwaiti and Iraqi
differences, suggesting that even at that stage arbitration was worth trying).
45. Patrick E. Tyler, U.S. Seeks Pressure on Iraq as Arab Talks Fail, WASH. POST, Aug. 5,
1990, at Al; Habiby, supra note 40, at 16-17.
46. Saul Friedman, For U.S., Options Aren't Inviting, NEWSDAY, Aug. 3, 1990, at 5
(reporting view of Pentagon and other experts that Iraq might withdraw if it got lease rights
to Gulf islands and a financial settlement from Kuwait).
47. S.C. Res. 662, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/662 (1990).
48. Current Documents, supra note 30, at 282, 286.
49. John Kifner, U.S. May Send Saudis a Force of 50,000; Iraq Proclaims Kuwait's Annexation;
'Merger' Declared, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1990, at Al ("Responding to an airlift of United States
forces to Saudi Arabia and the international embargo that has stilled the flow of his country's
oil, President Saddam Hussein of Iraq today defiantly announced his outright annexation of
Kuwait."). Iraq also claimed that Kuwait was historically part of Iraq. Current Documents, supra
note 30, at 282, 286.
50. S.C. Res. 662, supra note 47, at 1.
51. See generally supra text accompanying note 40 (discussing the dispute between Iran
and Iraq over the Shatt al-Arab river).
52. See John Quigley, Iran and Iraq and the Obligations to Release and Repatriate Prisoners of
War After the Close of Hostilities, 5 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 73 (1989).
53. Habiby, supra note 40, at 17.
54. Williams, supra note 6, at Al. The Thalweg is defined as "the middle of the deepest
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Iraq's position on its invasion of Kuwait is based on territorial claims
that have, as a matter of history and international law, a certain
plausibility Despite the plausibility of its claims, Iraq was not free to
enforce them by force of arms. If Kuwaitis and Iraqis considered
themselves to be one people, a merger should have resulted from some
expression of sentiment by the governments or people, but Iraq had no
right to bring about a merger on its own initiative. Its invasion and
occupation of Kuwait constituted aggression, as the Security Council
determined.
C. The International Response
However, the fact that real disputes underlay the Iraqi invasion was
relevant to the international response. Under Article 39 of the U.N.
Charter, the Security Council is obliged to recommend peaceful means
to resolve conflicts between warring parties.' When, as with Kuwait
and Iraq, territorial and financial disputes are at issue, the Council must
promote negotiation. The Security Council did this in its first
resolution on the Iraq-Kuwait situation, calling on Iraq and Kuwait "to
begin immediately intensive negotiations for the resolution of their
differences."59 However, the Security Council did not follow up on this
suggestion in its subsequent actions and declarations, movig instead to
impose economic sanctions against Iraq within a few days.w
Some observers did suggest that Iraq and Kuwait engage in binding
arbitration to resolve their differences,"' and the Arab League explored
common ground for a negotiated settlement.62 However, the Security
Council never pursued this route of negotiation between the parties. The
exiled Kuwaiti government also did not show any willingness to
negotiate, and the Security Council did not pressure it to do so. Thus,
in dealing with Iraq's aggressive occupation of Kuwait, the U.N. virtually
or most navigable channel, as distinguished from the geographic center or a line midway
between the banks." BLAcK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1477 (6th ed. 1990).
55. See supra part IA. However, Iraq's recognition of Kuwait in 1963 seriously undercut
its claim to sovereignty. Khadduri, supra note 26, at 25-26.
56. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4; S.C. Res. 660, supra note 5, at 1.
57. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. See also John Quigley, The United States and the United Nations
in the Persian Gulf War: A New Order or Disorder?, 25 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 401,434-35 (stating that
Article 39 obliges the Security Council to make recommendations to the parties as an initial step
and, if necessary, follow with sanctions under Articles 41 and 42).
58. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
59. S.C. Res. 660, supra note 5, para. 3.
60. S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990).
61. Marc Weller, A Peace Plan for the Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1990, at A21.
62. John Kifner, 13 of21 in Arab League Meet on Avoiding a War, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 31,1990,
at A12.
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ignored outstanding issues between the two parties and proceeded
quickly first to economic, and then to military sanctions.'
H1. ISRAEL'S RATIONALE FOR OCCUPYING NEIGHBORING
ARAB TERRITORIES
The rationale asserted by Israel for its 1967 occupation of the West
Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights was
quite different from Iraq's rationale for occupying Kuwait. Far from
raising a territorial claim, Israel claimed that it was attacked by Egypt,
and that it had responded defensively against Egypt and its allies, Jordan
and Syria." Israel's claim of self-defense was said to justify a weaker
U.N. reaction to Israel in 1967 than that taken toward Iraq in 1990.6
Furthermore, if Israel had acted defensively, it would legitimize Israel's
initial use of force,' putting Israel in a more favorable light than Iraq.
It might, in addition, color the terms of a settlement of the territorial
issue; if Israel were deemed to be in a vulnerable position, it would have
a stronger argument for expanding its borders at strategic points.
Therefore, the claim that Israel acted defensively bears examination.
A. Historical Background of the 1967 War
The military action that began the 1967 war was ordered by the
Israeli cabinet on June 4 of that year.67 At dawn on June 5, the Israeli
air force bombed Egyptian fighter aircraft, parked at their home bases.
Taking the Egyptian air force by surprise,' Israel demolished almost
300 of Egypt's 340 combat aircraft.69 By the end of the day on June 5,
Israel had destroyed the air war capacity not only of Egypt, but also of
63. See S.C. Res. 678, supra note 13 (concerning military sanctions); S.C. Res. 661, supra
note 60 (concerning economic sanctions); infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
65. Susan Crosland, Playing Prison Reformer with a Poker Face, SUNDAY TIMES, Oct. 14,1990,
at C7; Real Linkage; Iraq-Kuwait Crisis's Effects on Arab-Israeli Conflict, NATION, Dec. 31, 1990, at
827; Shlomo Slonim, Withdrawal and the Origins of Aggression, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 14, 1990, at
4.
66. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
67. DAVID KIMcHE & DAN BAWLY, THE SANDSTORM: THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR OF JUNE 1967:
PRELUDE AND AFTERMATH 134-56 (1968); Howard Koch, June 1967: The Question of Aggression,
15 ARAB WORLD 10-13 (1969). The account that follows is based on JOHN QUIGLEY, PALESTINE
AND ISRAEL: A CHALLENGE TO JUSTICE 161-68 (1990).
68. EDGAR O'BALLANCE, THE THIRD ARAB ISRAELI WAR 49 (1972); EzER WEIZMAN, ON
EAGLES' WINGS: THE PERSONAL STORY OF THE LEADING COMMANDER OF THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE
221-27 (1976) (describing the attack); Michael Akehurst, The Arab-Israeli Conflict and International
Law, 5 N.Z. U. L. REV. 231, 241 (1973).
69. SYDNEY D. BAILEY, THE MAKING OF RESOLUTION 242, at 68 (1985); ROBERT STEPHENS,
NASSER: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 493 (1971).
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Jordan, Syria, and Iraq." Simultaneously, Israeli ground forces attacked
Egypt, moving quickly through the Gaza Strip and into the Sinai
Peninsula.'
In the U.N., Egypt charged Israel with aggression.' Israel
countered that Egypt had struck first;' Israeli Foreign Minister Abba
Eban told the Security Council:
[O]n the morning of 5 June, when Egyptian forces engaged us by air
and land, bombarding the villages of Kissufim, Nahal-Oz and Ein
Hashelosha we knew that our limit of safety had been reached, and
perhaps passed. In accordance with its inherent right of self-defence as
formulated in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, Israel responded
defensively in full strength.74
Eban added that "approaching Egyptian aircraft appeared on our radar
screens."
75
Egypt did not strike first.' The Security Council, however, did not
inquire into the facts!" While the United States was aware that Israel
struck first, it did not provide this information to the Security Council."
1. Israel's Claim of Anticipatory Self-Defense. After the war in 1967,
Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol implicitly admitted that Eban had lied
to the Security Council about who struck first. Eshkol said that Israel
had initiated military action. He also claimed that Israel attacked Egypt
70. DONALD NEFF, WARRIORS FOR JERUSALEM: THE Six DAYS THAT CHANGED THE MIDDLE
EAST 203 (1984); STEPHENS, supra note 69, at 498.
71. TOM J. FARER, 3 LAW AND WAR, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 15,
41 (Charles Black & Richard Falk eds., 1971); PIERRE-MARIE MARTIN, LE CONFLrr ISRAELO-ARABE:
RECHERCHFS SUR LEMPLOI DE LA FORCE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POSITIF 153-54 (1973)
72. U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1347th mtg. at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1347 (1967) (statement of
Mr. El Kony, United Arab Republic). See also U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1348th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.1348 (1967) (report of June 5 statement by representative of former Soviet Union).
73. U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1347th mtg., supra note 72, at 1 (communication of Permanent
Representative of Israel to President of Security Council).
74. U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1348th mtg., supra note 72, at 15.
75. Id. See also WEIZMAN, supra note 68, at 215 (explaining concern among Israeli
commanders in the days preceding June 5 that the U.N. and the major powers would try to
enforce a cease-fire shortly after Israel attacked Egypt).
76. Admission on Attack, TIMES (London), July 8,1967, at 3 (stating that Eshkol "buried the
often-repeated statement that Egyptian [air] and land forces attacked Israel before she launched
her devastating lightning offensive on June 5").
77. U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1348th mtg., supra note 74, passim; U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1347th
mtg., supra note 72, passim.
78. ANDREW & LESLIE COCKBURN, DANGEROUS LIASON: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE U.S.-
ISRAELI COVERT RELATIONSHIP 141-49 (1991). The United States had in fact tried, unsuccessfully,
to dissuade Israel from invading Egypt. LYNDON JOHNSON, THE VANTAGE POINT: PERSPECTIVES
OF THE PRESIDENCY 1963-1969, at 293 (1971).
79. Admission on Attack, supra note 76, at 3.
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to in what he termed "legitimate defence" to forestall an imminent
Egyptian invasion.'
President Chaim Herzog stated Israel's claim that Egypt had been on
the verge of attacking. Before the U.N., he said Israel was:
the victim of aggression when President Nasser with great fanfare
moved his armies into Sinai and in an atmosphere of Arab frenzy and
hysteria undertook publicly to annihilate Israel. He dosed the Straits
of Tran, peremptorily ordered the United Nations forces out of Sinai
and Gaza, and gathered around Israel an international Arab army bent
on the destruction of our country-as he put it in Arabic, "El-Kadaa a la
Israel"--the total annihilation of our people--men, women and
children!'
Herzog also accused Jordan of aggression against Israel. Six hours
after Israel began its invasion of Egypt, Jordan shelled Israel around
Jerusalem.' Herzog declared that Jordan had "launched a military
attack on Jerusalem along the Israeli border, indiscriminately bombing,
shelling and attacking Israeli towns and villages, including the Holy City
of Jerusalem."' Jordan did initiate the attack on Israel before Israel
fired at it, and Jordan's actions would constitute aggression unless Jordan
had acted in lawful defense of Egypt.'
Herzog characterized Israel's action as solely defensive.
As a result of this unprovoked Arab attack, which took place when we
were sitting along the 1967 lines, ... the territories under discussion
[the Gaza Strip and West Bank] fell under Israeli control where they are
today. We sought no war. We were promised annihilation. A new
holocaust was our prospect. We fought back to defend ourselves, our
wives, our children, our homes from a grim and unthinkable fate-a
fate, I repeat, openly promised us over every Arab medium by every
Arab leader in a wave of uncontrolled hysteria which is in itself
frightening and horrifying to recall to this day."
80. Id.
81. U.N. GAOR, 32d Sess., 2 Plen. mtgs. at 867-68, U.N. Doc. A/32/PV.47 (1978)
[hereinafter Statement of President Chaim Herzog].
82. Jordan, which had a defense treaty with Egypt, shelled Israel at half a dozen locations
around the country. O'BALLANCE, supra note 68, at 181; William O'Brien, International Law and
the Outbreak of War in the Middle East, 1967, 11 ORBIS 692, 703 (1969).
83. Statement of President Chaim Herzog, supra note 81, at 868.
84. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. See also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 102-03, 120 (June 27) (finding that under Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter, one state may act in the defense of another state that has been attacked, as
"collective self-defense").
85. Statement of President Chaim Herzog, supra note 81, at 868.
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One major obstacle, however, stands in the way of Israel's claim of
self-defense. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter permits the use of force in
self-defense only "if an armed attack occurs." ' Most commentators
read this clause to permit defensive force only in response to an armed
attack that has already begunf or at least is so imminent as to be
obvious.8s This was not the case when Israel opened hostilities with
Egypt: Egypt did not initiate an attack, nor were its forces making
obvious preparations for an imminent attack.'
In fact, a number of Israeli officials contradicted Eshkol's claim that
Israel acted on the morning of June 5,1967 because it thought Egypt was
about to attack. 0 The Israeli Chief of Staff, General Itzhak Rabin, stated
that he did not believe that Egyptian President Gamel Abdul Nasser
wanted war. He felt that the two divisions that Nasser sent into Sinai on
May 14 would not have been enough to unleash an offensive against
Israel. Rabin claimed that both Egypt and Israel knew that was the
case.' General Matitiahu Peled, a member of Israel's general staff in
1967, declared that the thesis according to which Israel struggled for its
physical existence was only a bluff born and developed after the war.'
According to Peled, the General Staff never told the government that the
Egyptian military threat represented any danger to Israel or that Israel
was unable to crush Nasser's army, which, according to Peled, with
unheard-of foolishness, had exposed itself to the devastating might of the
Israeli army.' Menachem Begin, a former Israeli Prime Minister and
86. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
87. LOuis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 141-43 (1979); John
L. Hargrove, Abating the Middle East Crisis Through the United Nations (and Vice Versa), 19 KAN.
L. REV. 365, 367 (1971); Oscar Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force, 53
U. OF CHI. L. REv. 113,133 (1986). At least one commentator reads Article 51 more expansively
as incorporating a customary norm permitting an anticipatory use of force. DEREK W. BOWETr,
SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 188-93 (1958). That view still requires evidence that an
attack is so imminent so as not to enable the victim state to wait for the attack. 2 JOHN B.
MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (1906) (Secretary of State Daniel Webster
articulating the standard that the "necessity of self-defense is instant, overwhelming and leaving
no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation"). Even under this approach, which gives
a state greater latitude to make an assessment that it is about to be attacked, Israel had no
factual basis to substantiate that an imminent Egyptian attack was likely. See infra notes 90-95
and accompanying text. In particular, U.S. military intelligence, which was monitoring the
situation, did not expect an Egyptian attack on Israel. Alfred J. Hotz, Legal Dilemmas: The Arab-
Israeli Conflict, 19 S.D. L. REV. 242, 264 (1974).
88. LAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 366-68 (1963);
HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL
PROBLEMS 792 (1950).
89. See infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
90. HEINz WAGNER, DER ARABisCH-ISRAELUSCHE KONFLIT M VOLKERRECHT 434 (1971).
91. Le gfnral Rabin ne pense pas que Nasser voulait la guerre, LE MONDE, Feb. 29, 1968, at
1.
92. Amnon Kapeliouk, Israel dtait-il riellement menac! dextermination?, LE MONDE, June 3,
1972, at 4.
93. Id.
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a member of the cabinet which voted to attack Egypt, said that "[iln June
1967, we again had a choice. The Egyptian Army concentrations in the
Sinai approaches do not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us.
We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him."9' As for
why Israel attacked Egypt, Begin said that it was to "take the initiative
and attack the enemy, drive him back, and thus assure the security of
Israel and the future of the nation."95
2. Actions of Egypt Cited by Israel. Prime Minister Eshkol's
administration pointed to the recent conclusion of an Egyptian-Jordanian
defensive alliance,' and to verbal threats by President Nasser against
Israel7 to demonstrate that Egypt was about to attack. In addition,
Israel also relied upon three Egyptian actions: the partial closure of the
Straits of Tran to Israeli-flag vessels; the movement of Egyptian troops
up to the Israeli-Egyptian border; and, Egypt's request that the U.N.
withdraw peacekeeping forces stationed on the Egyptian side of the
Egyptian-Israeli border.8
However, the complaints raised by Israel can partly be explained by
other evidence. Nasser did make belligerent statements toward Israel,
but they were conditioned upon an Israeli invasion of Syria.9 Israel's
second complaint concerns Egypt's decision on May 22, 1967, not to
permit passage of Israeli flag vessels, or any vessel carrying strategic
material to Israel through the Straits of Tiran.'" Israel argued that the
closure gave it reason to expect an imminent attack by Egypt.101
However, Nasser cited Israel's threats against Syria and a presumed
Israeli troop build-up facing Syria as his rationale for the closure.1°2
94. CHERYL RUBENBERG, ISRAEL AND THE AMERICAN NATIONAL INTERES 267, 276 (1986);
Excerpts from Begin Speech at National Defense College, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1982, at A6
[hereinafter Excerpts from Begin Speech]. See URI AVNERY, MY FRIEND, THE ENEMY 234 (1986)
(discussing the lack of PLO attacks from Lebanon in the year preceding Israers 1982 invasion
and the lack of a basis for Israel to expect any attacks from Lebanon in the immediate future).
95. Excerpts from Begin Speech, supra note 94, at A6.
96. 1967 U.N.Y.B. 195-96, U.N. Sales No. E.68.I.1.
97. Id.; ALLAN GERSON, ISRAEL, THE WEST BANK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 71 (1978); Amos
Shapira, The Six-Day War and the Right of Self-Defence, 6 ISRAEL L. REV. 65, 76 (1971).
98. 1967 U.N.Y.B., supra note 96, at 195-96; GERSON, supra note 97, at 71; Shapira, supra
note 97, at 76.
99. F. YAHIA, THE PALESTINE QUESTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 152-54 (1970). In a
speech in which he stressed Israel's threats against Syria, President Nasser said, "[w]hen we
said we were ready for battle, we meant that we would indeed fight if Syria or any other Arab
State was subjected to aggression." Text of Nasser's Speech on the Blockade of Aqaba, N.Y. TIMES,
May 26, 1967, at A16.
100. Id.
101. U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1348th mtg., supra note 72, at 14 (statement of Mr. Eban, Israel).
102. 16 KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES 22065 (1967).
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Third, Israel cites the fact that Egypt moved troops to the Israel-Egypt
1949 armistice line in mid-May. However, Egypt announced that the
troop movements were intended only to deter an Israeli attack on Syria
as his rationale for closure."°
Finally, Israel claims that Egypt's May 18 request to the U.N. to
withdraw the U.N. forces from the Egyptian-Israeli border gave it reason
to expect an attack.1' 4 These troops had been stationed on the
Egyptian side of the 1949 armistice line following the 1956 Egypt-Israel
war."5 The U.N. commander reported that Egypt said it was
preparing for "action against Israel, the moment it might carry out any
aggressive action against any Arab country." " This again suggests
that Egypt planned to attack Israel only if Israel invaded Syria.
Following the Egyptian request, U.N. Secretary-General U Thant asked
Israel to let him move the U.N. forces to the Israeli side of the armistice
line, but Israel dedined.1°7 U Thant also proposed "that a U.N.
representative go to Israel, Egypt, and Jordan to arrange a settlement.
;" Egypt accepted the idea, but Israel rejected it.1'
3. The Syrian Factor. The Egyptian concern for an Israeli attack on
Syria was not irrational."°  In April 1967, the Israeli army had
undertaken cultivation of land in a demilitarized zone between Israel
and Syria in violation of the 1949 Israel-Syria armistice. 0 Israel, over
103. Akehurst, supra note 68, at 240. Evidently, the Israeli Ministry of Defense accepted
this explanation, because General Rabin reported to the Israeli cabinet that the Egyptian forces
were in a "defensive posture." NEF, supra note 70, at 93. See supra notes 90-94 and
accompanying text.
104. U.N SCOR, 22d Sess., 1348th mtg., supra note 72, at 14.
105. G.A. Res. 1125, U.N. GAOR, 11th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 62, U.N. Doc. A/3572 (1957).
106. INDAR Jrr RIKHYE, THE SINAI BLUNDER: WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS
EmERGENCY FORCE LEADING TO THE SIx-DAY WAR OF JUNE 1967, at 16 (1980).
107. Report of the Secretary-General on the Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force,
U.N. GAOR, 22d Sess., 5th Emerg. Spec. Sess. at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6730/Add.3 (1967). U Thant
suggested that "if only Israel had agreed to permit UNEF to be stationed on its side of the
border, even for a short duration, the course of history could have been different. Diplomatic
efforts to avert the pending catastrophe might have prevailed and war might have been
averted." U THANT, VIEW FROM THE UN 223 (1977). If Israel had been concerned about an
Egyptian attack, the logical response would have been to accept U Thant's offer. Quincy
Wright, The Middle Eastern Crisis, 64 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 80 (1970). Israel's rejection
suggested that it was not concerned about an Egyptian invasion. Akehurst, supra note 68, at
240. But see Ruth Lapidoth, The Security Council in the May 1967 Crisis: A Study in Frustration,
4 ISRAEL L. REv. 534, 536 n.9 (1969) (justifying Israel's rejection of the offer on the grounds that
the stationing of the U.N. forces in Israel at that time would not have prevented an Egyptian
attack).
108. RrrCHIE OVENDALE, THE ORIGINS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI WARS 178 (1984).
109. Hisham Sharabi, Prelude to War: The Crisis of May-June 1967, in THE ARAB-ISRAELI
CONFRONTATION OFJUNE 1967: AN ARAB PERSPECIVE49,53-57 (Ibrahim Abu-Lughod ed., 1970).
110. General Armistice Agreement, July 20, 1949, Israel-Syria, art. V(4), 42 U.N.T.S. 327,
327 (1949); HENRY CATrAN, PALESTINE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE
ARAB-IsRAELI CONFLICT 169-70 (2d ed. 1976).
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Security Council objections and Syrian protests, had consistently claimed
sovereignty in the portion of the demilitarized zone that fell on the
Israeli side of the 1949 armistice line.' On April 7, 1967, in order to
stop the cultivation, Syria attacked the demilitarized zone and Israel
retaliated."2
Israeli officials also levelled threats toward Syria. General Rabin
stated that it was necessary to overthrow the Syrian government to
protect Israel's national security,"' and on May 12, Israeli officials
communicated to Syria a threat to occupy Damascus and overthrow the
Syrian government."4 It seems clear that Israel "definitely
contemplated some kind of action against Syria in the course of the
month of May.""
In addition to the Israeli threats, other circumstances suggested to
President Nasser that Israel might invade Syria. Armored units were
absent from the May 15 Independence Day parade in Jerusalem,"6
indicating to Nasser that the tanks were being massed for an attack.
The Soviet government told Nasser that Israel had moved troops
towards the Syrian border, and on May 24, the former Soviet
government announced publicly that Israeli forces at the Syrian border
were in a state of battle readiness."8 Nasser became convinced that an
Israeli attack on Syria was imminent."9
The Israeli military leadership apparently concluded that Egypt
intended either to intervene in the event of an Israeli attack on Syria, or
to deter such an attack, but that Egypt did not intend to invade.2
111. S.C. Res. 93, U.N. SCOR, 6th Sess. at 7, U.N. Doc. S/INF/6/Rev.1 (1951).
112. OVENDALE, supra note 108, at 178; La gen2se de/a guerre, LE MONDE, June 7,1967, at 3.
113. OVENDALE, supra note 108, at 178.
114. MARTIN, supra note 71, at 155; Charles W. Yost, The Arab-Israel War: How it Began, 46
FOREIGN AFF. 304, 307 (1967) (public speech, Tel Aviv).
115. NADAV SAFRAN, FROM WAR TO WAR: THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFRONTATION, 1948-1967,
at 306 (1969). Israel claimed that it had the right to attack Syria to forestall cross-border
terrorist attacks which it claimed where sponsored by Syria. On May 11 Eshkol, referring to
cross-border attacks from Syria, said, "[t]he focal point of the terrorists is in Syria, but we have
laid down the principle that we shall choose the time, the place and the means to counter the
aggressor." Yost, supra note 114, at 307 (citing radio interview). See also Weekly News Bulletin
(Government of Israel), May'9-15, 1967, at 20, cited in Shapira, supra note 97, at 66.
116. James Feron, Parade in Israel Omits Heavy Arms, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1967, at A15.
117. OvENDALE, supra note 108, at 178.
118. Zaiavlenie sovetskogo pravitel'stva o polozhenii v Blizhnem Vostoke [Statement of the Soviet
Government on the Situation in the Near East], PRAVDA, May 24, 1967, at 1.
119. KIMCHE & BAwLY, supra note 67, at 91; ARTHUR LALL, THE UN AND THE MIDDLE EAST
CRISIS, 1967, at 7-8 (1970); STEPHENS, supra note 69, at 467. There was, in fact, no unusual Israeli
troop concentration near Syria, according to observers of the U.N. Truce Supervision
Organization. Syrian military commanders were operating under the belief that such
maneuvers were at hand. Report of the Secretary-General on the Withdrawal of the United Nations
Emergency Force, supra note 107, at 11.
120. Le g&niral Rabin ne pense pas que Nasser voulait la guerre, supra note 91, at 1 (stating
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While they had previously thought they could attack Syria without
incurring Egyptian intervention, "[tihe [Israeli] military now became
convinced that Nasser meant to intervene in case of an Israeli attack
against Syria . ... "121 Egypt's belief that Israel might invade Syria
apparently motivated its dispatch of troops toward Israel, its partial
closure of the Straits of Tran, and its request for a withdrawal of U.N.
troopsY2
B. The Closure of the Straits of Tiran as a Cause of War
Israel also claims that Egypt's May 22 partial closure of the Straits of
Tiran gave it a right to use military force against Egypt.123  Israel
argued, first, that the closure was an "armed attack" against Israel,
giving it a right of self-defense, and second, that the closure violated a
customary right to passage through the Straits which would permit
Israel to use force to secure passage. 4 However, Israel was entitled
to use force only if there actually existed aggression and if so, its
response would have to have been in proportion to that aggression.
1. The Closure of the Straits as an Act of Aggression. In justifying
Israel's actions, Abba Eban told the U.N. General Assembly, "[b]lockades
have traditionally been regarded, in the pre-Charter parlance, as acts of
war. To blockade, after all, is to attempt strangulation." 125 It is
doubtful, however, that the Egyptian closure of the Straits of Tiran in
1967 constituted a blockade for the purposes of establishing acts of
aggression because the Straits are within Egyptian territorial waters.
6
No situation has arisen in international practice in which a state was
considered to have committed aggression by establishing a blockade in
its own territorial waters."V But even if the action were deemed a
violation of Israel's maritime rights, it would not be a blockade, but only
a violation of a right of innocent passage. 28 Thus, the portrayal of
that Nasser knew, and Israel's general staff knew, that the Egyptian troops on the border could
not have successfully invaded Israel).
121. SAFRAN, supra note 115, at 307.
122. Quincy Wright, Legal Aspects of the Middle East Situation, 33 LAW & CONTEM'P. PROBS.
5, 8 (1968).
123. Kenneth M. Lewan, Justifications for the Opening of Hostilities in the Middle East, 26
REVUE tGYPTIENNE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL 88 passin (1970).
124. See infra notes 125-59 and accompanying text.
125. U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1348th mtg., supra note 72, at 17 (statement of Mr. Eban, Israel).
126. The navigable part of the channel is located only one mile from Egypt's shore. 16
KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES, supra note 102, at 22064.
127. See generally C. JOHN COLOMBOS, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 714-52 (1967)
(reporting no such case).
128. Id.
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Egypt's closing of the Straits as constituting an act of aggression is not
supportable under international legal principles.
Moreover, Egypt's action was defensive in nature. 29 Egypt was
concerned that if Israel invaded Syria, Israel would, with the U.N. troops
gone, use the Straits to bring in war materiel."' Egypt did not declare
an intent to restrict non-Israeli flag vessels carrying non-strategic
materials, nor did it declare an intent to restrict Israeli registered vessels
chartered to a non-Israeli carrier. 3' Rather, the partial closure was
aimed at enhancing Egypt's ability to respond if Israel invaded Syria.
Nasser made his decision only after U.N. Secretary General U Thant
removed the U.N. forces from Sharm el-Sheikh, which commands the
entrance to the Straits of Tran."' Although Nasser had requested
removal of U.N. forces from their border positions, he had not requested
their withdrawal from Sharm el-Sheikh.1' Nasser evidently had not
planned to close the Straits until "the total evacuation of the UN forced
his hand." 134
Even if the Egyptian action did constitute an aggressive blockade,
Israel was entitled to act in self-defense only within the bounds of
proportionality." Here Israel undertook a full-scale invasion of Egypt,
destroying its air force and sending troops deep into Egyptian
territory. However, Israel's government had determined that the
closure did not constitute as much of a security threat to Israel as did the
Egyptian troop concentrations in the Sinai." Publicly, Israel claimed
it faced "economic strangulation,"" yet Israel had barely used the Gulf
of Aqaba, at the end of which sit the Straits of Tiran, for commercial
transportation. 39 The most significant cargo for which Israel used Eilat
was oil, carried on non-Israeli flag vessels, which is why Egypt was
concerned about Israel's use of the Straits in the event of an Israeli
invasion of Syria."
129. Roger Fisher, Legality of Arab Position, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1967, at E13 (Professor of
International Law at Harvard Law School).
130. HENRY CATrAN, PALEsTN AND INTERIATIOkIAL LAW 174 (1976).
131. See supra note 99.
132. 16 KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARcHIVES, supra note 102, at 22064.
133. KIMCHE & BAWLY, supra note 67, at 92.
134. Id. at 95.
135. BROWNUE, supra note 88, at 261-64; Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed
Force, 82 MIcH. L. REV. 1620, 1637-38 (1984).
136. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
137. David Mandel, The 1967 Arab-Israel War in Retrospect: A Case Against
'Anticipatory Self-Defense' 32 (1988) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
138. FRED J. KHOuRI, THE ARAB-ISRAELI DILEMMA 250 (3d ed. 1985).
139. During the two years preceding June 1967, no Israeli flag vessel had used the port of
Eilat. NEFF, supra note 70, at 87. Cf. LALL, supra note 119, at 37 (stating that the last Israeli ship
to enter the Straits of Tiran had done so eighteen months earlier). Most of Israel's exports and
imports used Mediterranean ports. Mandel, supra note 137, at 31.
140. STEPHENS, supra note 69, at 488-89; Lewan, supra note 123, at 89. See also WEIZMAN,
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2. The Closure of the Straits of Tiran as a Violation of a Customanj Right.
Israel also asserted that the partial closure of the Straits of Tiran violated
Israel's right under customary law to use the Straits, and that this
violation justified Israel's attack on Egypt. 4' Egypt said, to the
contrary, that it was under no duty to permit such use, and that even if
it was, the breach of such a duty would not permit Israel to resort to
force.'
Egypts position, that it was not required to permit Israeli-fla ;vessels
through the Straits of Tran, was based on two propositions. First,
Egypt argued that Egypt and Israel had been in a state of war since 1948;
as a result, Egypt was not required to afford Israel (as a belligerent)
rights to which it might have been entitled during peacetime."
Responding to this argument, Israel contended that the 1949 Egyptian-
Israeli armistice"4 terminated the state of war between Egypt and
Israel. 46 However, an armistice "does not terminate a state of war
existing between the belligerents, either de jure or de facto.... "'47 The
"Israeli-Arab Armistice General Agreements did not create even a defacto
termination of the war between those states."'4
Israel also argued that a state of war no longer existed with Egypt
because, under the U.N. Charter, a state of war between two U.N.
member states is an impossibility. The Charter prohibits members from
resorting to aggressive war: "our mutual obligations are still defined by
the Charter of the U.N. which rules out any concept of a 'state of
war.'' 49 Generally, however, most states reject that view, because it
supra note 68, at 248 (indicating that Sharm el-Sheikh was not an immediate objective of the IDF
attack on Egypt but was attacked on June 7 to rationalize Israel's having made a casus belli of
Egypts partial closure of the Gulf of Aqaba).
141. Abdel Latif Zeidan, The Emergence of the Gulf ofAqaba Problem, 35 REVUE AGYTIMENNE
DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL 1, 16 (1979) (account of Egypt's arguments).
142. Id. at 53.
143. Id. at 54-56.
144. The Aqaba Question and International Law, 13 REVUE tGYPTIENNE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 86, 91-93 (1957); Charles B. Selak, Jr., A Consideration of the Legal Status of the
Gulf of Aqaba, 52 AM. J. INT L L. 660, 667-68 (1958). A belligerent "may exploit a strait which
it controls in order to cut off contraband from the enemy and to deny passage to enemy
shipping in time of active hostilities." RICHARD R. BAXTER, THE LAW OF INTERNAL WATERWAYS
wrT PARTICULAR REGARD TO INTEROCEANIC CANALS 215 (1964).
145. General Armistice Agreement, Feb. 24, 1949, Israel-Egypt, 42 U.N.T.S. 251.
146. Selak, supra note 144, at 670.
147. Howard Levie, The Nature and Scope of the Armistice Agreement, 50 AM. J. INTL L. 880,
884 (1956). See 2 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 546-47 (Hersch Lauterpacht, ed., 7th
ed. 1952).
148. Levie, supra note 147, at 886.
149. Letter Dated 25 January 1957from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United
Nations, Addressed to the Secretary-General, 11 U.N. GAOR, Annex V, Agenda Item 66, at 61, U.N.
Doc. A/3527 (1957); SHABTAi ROSENNE, ISRAEL'S ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS WITH THE ARAB STATES:
A JURIDICAL INTERPRETATION 85 (1951).
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would lead to the conclusion that no law governs the conduct of
belligerents once war begins."5
Second, Egypt argued that under customary law Israel did not have
a right to use the Straits of Tiran. Although straits are open to all, only
a passage between two areas of the high seas constitutes a strait. 1
Under this definition, the Straits of Tran is not actually a strait since it
leads from the high seas into a bay.' 2 Taking a different approach, the
1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone
defined "strait" to include a passage between the high seas and the
territorial sea of a state, which would cover the Straits of Tran.' s
However, Egypt did not ratify that convention precisely because it
objected to that definition."s
States have differed on whether there existed a customary
international law right of passage through the Straits of Tiran.-s
United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles maintained that there
was such a right of passage, but conceded that there was "plausibility
from the standpoint of international law" to Egypt's position.'- At the
Geneva Conference leading to the 1958 Convention, a substantial
minority held that no such right of passage existed.57 The head of the
United States delegation to the Geneva Conference said that the
Convention adopted a "new rule," one "which clearly applied to the
Israeli-Arab controversy."" s Thus, there was no consensus on a
customary law right of passage through the Straits of Tiran. Even if
Israel had a right to passage through the Straits of Tiran, it would not be
entitled to attack Egypt to assert that right. An unlawful Egyptian
refusal to permit passage would give rise to a dispute the resolution of
which would need to be sought by peaceful means.5 9
150. Richard R. Baxter, The Definition of War, 16 REVUE tGYPTIENNE DE DROrr
INTERNATIONAL 1, 8 (1960).
151. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 28 (April 9).
152. Momtaz Djamchid, Du droit de passage dans le detroit de Tiran, 30 REVUE tGYPTIENNE
DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL 27 (1974).
153. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 16(4),
15 U.S.T. 1606, 1611, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, 210 (1958).
154. Au A. EL-HAIM, THE MIDDLE EASTERN STATES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 156 (1979).
See also Leo Gross, Passage through the Straits of Tiran and in the Gulf of Aqaba, 33 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 125,144 (1968); Quincy Wright, The Middle East Problem, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 270,
279 (1970) (both authors stating that international law obliged Egypt to permit Israeli ships
through the Straits of Titan).
155. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
156. Dulles, News Conference, July 16, 1957, 37 DEP'T ST. BULL. 228, 232 (1957).
157. Gross, supra note 154, at 574-80.
158. Arthur H. Dean, The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: What Was Accomplished,
52 AM. J. INT'L L. 607, 623 (1958).
159. U.N. CHARTER art. 33.
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C. Israel's Retention of the Arab Territories
On June 9, 1967, Israel invaded Syria," and rapidly advanced
through the Golan Heights, a highland area of western Syria, before
moving deeper into Syrian territory.16 Since the beginning of the
Israeli occupation of the Arab Territories, a number of theories have been
advanced to justify its continued presence. These theories all assume
that Israel acted in self-defense during the 1967 war. One commentator
argued that a state which takes territory in self-defense may lawfully
annex it.'62 But that view attracted little following, as it disregards
Article 51, which allows only so much force as is necessary to repel the
aggression.' 63 Thus, even if Israel had acted in self-defense, its
continued retention of those Occupied Territories would not be
justified.'" Under the U.N. Charter, there can be no lawful territorial
gains from war, even by a state acting in self-defense."
Another theory suggested that Israel's taking of the Arab Territories
was necessary and proportional in relation to its security needs, and that
this necessity did not immediately subside."6 One commentator said
that, when a state has taken territory defensively
[a]s a condition of its withdrawal from such territory, that state may
require the institution of security measures reasonably designed to
ensure that that territory shall not again be used to mount a threat or
use of force against it of such a nature as to justify exercise of self-
defense.167
160. BAILEY, supra note 69, at 84-85; STEPHENS, supra note 69, at 499 (noting several minor
attacks by Syria against Israel on June 5 and 6).
161. WEIZMAN, supra note 68, at 257-58. Under pressure from the United States, Israel
pulled back but continued to hold the Golan Heights, which it still occupies. Drew Middleton,
Cease-Fire in Syria Accepted; Israelis Hold Border Heights; Soviet Union Breaks Ties to Israel, N.Y.
TaiES, June 11, 1967, at Al.
162. MARTIN, supra note 71, at 261-65.
163. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
164. J.R. GAINSBOROUGH, THE ARAB ISRAELI CONFLIcT: A POLITICO-LEGAL ANALYSIS 149
(1986) (stating that Israel's retention of the Occupied Territories exceeded the limits of
proportionality); id. at 158 ("[1Wlhen one considers the total geographic area of Arab lands still
occupied by Israel since 1967 it seems that the area occupied far exceeds Israel's present security
needs.").
165. Quincy Wright, The Palestine Conflict in International Law, in MAJOR MIDDLE EASrERN
PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 13,27 (Majid Khadduri ed., 1972); Wright, supra note 154, at
270.
166. John Norton Moore, The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Obligation to Pursue Peaceful
Settlement of International Disputes, 19 KAN. L. REV. 403, 425 (1971).
167. Stephen Schwebel, What Weight to Conquest?, 64 AM. J. INTL L. 344, 345-46 (1970).
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Along this same line, one commentator said that Israel might lawfully
retain the territories pending a peace agreement between itself and the
Arab states.'6
The danger of these justifications is illustrated by Israel's occupation;
a state that has taken territory defensively will always argue that there
remains a danger of a repeat attack. After Israel took the Gaza Strip, the
West Bank, and the Golan Heights, the armies of Jordan, Egypt, and
Syria were in no condition to attack Israel. They were left with virtually
no air power. Israel enjoyed such a commanding position militarily that
its defensive right evaporated, and it was obligated to withdraw. 61
Other commentators have argued that Israel might permanently and
lawfully retain these territories on the theory that Jordan and Egypt did
not hold lawful title to the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Without an
original sovereign to whom the territories could revert,70 it is argued
that Israel had a better claim to title than anyone else by taking the
territories defensively." One commentator stated that: "Where the
prior holder of territory had seized that territory unlawfully, the state
which subsequently takes that territory in the lawful exercise of self-
defense has, against that prior holder, better title.""r
However, uncertainty over sovereignty provides no ground to retain
territory taken in hostilities. Even if Jordan only held the West Bank on
a de facto basis, Israel could not acquire title if it were acting in self-
defense."n To determine title to the territory, one must follow the
accepted indicia of sovereignty.
D. Israel's Reasons for the Occupation
Despite President Herzog's statement that "[w]e sought no war,"74
Israel had long coveted the Gaza Strip and West Bank, both part of
Palestine." The founders of Israel aimed to turn the whole of
Palestine into a Jewish state and, therefore, sought ways to acquire the
West Bank and Gaza Strip. 6 In late 1948 and early 1949, the Israeli
168. Akehurst, supra note 68, at 242.
169. Hargrove, supra note 87, at 367.
170. JuIUS STONE, ISRAEL AND PALESTINE: ASSAULT ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 52 (1981);
Yehuda Z. Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea and Samaria, 3 ISRAEL
L. REV. 279, 294 (1968); Schwebel, supra note 167, at 346.
171. STONE, supra note 170, at 52; Blum, supra note 170, at 294.
172. Schwebel, supra note 167, at 346.
173. Antonio Cassese, Legal Considerations on the International Status of Jerusalem, 3
PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. 13, 24 (1986).
174. Statement of President Chaim Herzog, supra note 81, at 868.
175. QUIGLEY, supra note 67, at 87-89; Editorial, Troubled Truce, ECONOMIST, Aug. 21, 1948,
at 289, 289-90.
176. LIVIA ROKACH, ISRAEL'S SACRED TERRORISM: A STUDY BASED ON MOSHE SHARETf'S
PERSONAL DIARY AND OTHER DOcUMENTS 18 (1980) (entry in diary of Prime Minister Moshe
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government planned to attack these territories, but backed off under
pressure from Britain and the United States.'77 Again, in 1955, Prime
Minister David Ben Gurion proposed the invasion and permanent
occupation of the Gaza Strip. However, the Israeli cabinet refused to
permit the invasion due to concern over the probable worldwide
negative reaction.'78 In 1956, Israel did invade Egypt and occupied the
Gaza Strip but withdrew a few months later under international
pressure. Israel's army nonetheless continued to make contingency plans
to invade Egypt, Syria, and Jordan.
Apparently, Israel's reason for attacking Egypt in 1967 was to take
the segments of Palestine that had eluded it in 1948.11 Israel spurned
efforts by King Hussein of Jordan to negotiate a cease-fire until after it
had captured the West Bank.'' Mordecai Bentov, a cabinet minister
who attended the June 4 meeting and voted to invade Egypt, stated that
"[t]his entire story about the danger of extermination was invented of
whole cloth and exaggerated after the fact to justify the annexation of
new Arab territories." ' 2 General Ezer Weizman, chief of the General
Staff Branch in 1967, said the war was "a direct continuation" of the 1948
hostilities, by which he meant that it was a war for territory."' The
tension that had built up gave Israel an opportunity to attack under
circumstances that it could publicly depict as threatening to its
existencel 4
Since Israel had no right to attack Egypt in 1967, Jordan's use of force
against Israel was a lawful and defensive action in support of Egypt.
Therefore, Israel's counterattack against Jordan and its occupation of the
West Bank was part of its illegal aggression against Egypt.
Israeli President Herzog characterized Israel's occupation of the
Golan Heights as a defensive reaction to Syria's participation in Egypt's
aggressive acts.8's However, Egypt did not commit aggression against
Sharett).
177. TOM SEGEV, 1949: THE FIRST ISRAELIS 3 (1986). [1948] 5 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES 1704 (message from acting secretary of state to U.S. representative (McDonald)
in Israel, indicating that U.S. would block U.N. membership for Israel if it took the Gaza Strip);
id. at 1705 (Britain to notify U.S. that Israeli failure to withdraw would trigger 1936 Anglo-
Egyptian mutual defense treaty).
178. ROKACH, supra note 176, at 50.
179. KIMCHE & BAWLY, supra note 67, at 179; Hotz, supra note 87, at 254-55.
180. Wright, supra note 107, at 80.
181. NEFF, supra note 70, at 228 (Hussein efforts for cease-fire June 6); id. at 238 (Hussein
still seeking cease-fire June 7).
182. Kapeliouk, supra note 92, at 4 (quoting Bentov).
183. Ezer Weizman, Without Complications: A Formula to Minimize the Chances for a New War,
HAARETZ, Mar. 29, 1972, at 9, excerpted in JOHN K. COOLEY, GREEN MARCH, BLAcK SEPTEMBER:
THE STORY OF THE PALESTINIAN ARABS 162 (1973).
184. STEPHENS, supra note 69, at 491.
185. Statement of President Chaim Herzog, supra note 81, at 185 (stating that Egypt
organized an "international Arab army" in which Herzog presumably meant to include Syria).
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Israel, and Syria did not attack Israel prior to Israel's invasion of the
Golan Heights.'" Even if Syria had attacked following Israel's invasion
of Egypt, the action would be similar in character to the Jordanian action
and, thus, part of the collective self-defense of Egypt. It follows that
Israel's invasion of Syria was also an act of aggression.
After the 1967 war, Prime Minister Eshkol said Israel would keep
what he called "the new areas." 87 "Be under no illusion," Eshkol said,
"that the State of Israel is prepared to return to the situation that reigned
up to a week ago .... The position that existed until now shall never
again return."" Eshkol ordered Israel's cartographers to delete the
lines separating Israel from the Occupied Territories on new maps.'
Foreign Minister Eban told the U.N. General Assembly that "the
suggestion that everything goes back to where it was before 5 June is
totally unacceptable.""9 Itzhak Shamir, who became prime minister
of Israel in 1983, said that the 1967 war "put the stamp of permanency
on the state's borders."91 Within three months of the war, Israel began
settling its citizens in the West Bank. 92 Its settlement agency declared,
"no political victory, no proclamation, can convert these territories into
Jewish territories if they are not settled by Jews." 93
The Israeli government was particularly clear in its intent not to
return East Jerusalem, which it captured from Jordan as part of the West
Bank. The Knesset passed a statute that applied Israeli law and
administration to East Jerusalem, effectively annexing it 94 Later it
declared the entire city to be Israel's capital.95 In 1981 the Knesset
passed a similar law regarding Syria's Golan Heights, declaring the
application of Israeli law and administration over the area and effectively
annexing it.'96 Without asserting any historical claim to the Heights,
186. See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
187. BAILEY, supra note 69, at 129.
188. Eshkol Offers Arabs Peace with Us as We Are, JERUSALEM POST, June 13, 1967, at 2;
Sydney Gruson, Eshkol Rejects Return of Israel to Old Frontiers, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1967, at Al.
189. Misha Louvish, The Spectre of the Green Line, JERUSALEM POST (int'l ed.), Oct. 25, 1986,
at 15.
190. U.N. GAOR, 22nd Sess., 5th Emerg. Spec. Sess., plen. mtgs. at 15, U.N. Doc. A/PV.
1526 (1967) (statement of Mr. Eban, Israel).
191. Joel Greenberg, Shamir: Our Rule as Long as Jordan's, JERUSALEM POST (int'l. ed.), June
14,1986, at 3 (quoting Shamir).
192. Hedrick Smith, U.S. Chides Israelis on Settler Program, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27,1967, at Al.
193. Statement of the Zionist Executive, in Reports Submitted to the Twenty-Seventh Zionist
Congress in Jerusalem for the Period April, 1964 - December, 1967, 53 (1968), cited in ABDEEN M.
JABARA, ON BEHALF OF THE COMMnrEE TO CHALLENGE THE ABUSE OF THE CHARITABLE
CONTRIBUTION EXEMPTION AND DEDUCTION, in General Tax Reform: Public Hearings Before the
House Committee on Ways and Means, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1758, 1773 (1973).
194. Law and Administration Ordinance (Amendment No. 11), 21 LAWS OF THE STATE OF
ISRAEL 75 (1967).
195. Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, 34 LAWS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 209 (1980).
196. Golan Heights Law, 36 LAWS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 7 (1981).
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Israel's government said it would not return them because of their geo-
strategic importance.'97 As for the West Bank, Prime Minister Shamir
declared in 1991 that the "green line," meaning the eastern border of
Israel, "does not exist." 9' His Health Minister, Ehud Olmert, said, "we
believe our boundaries are at the Jordan River," which would include
the West Bank.' 99
III. THE IRAQI ACTION AS A PRECEDENT
In Resolution 242, the U.N. Security Council noted that "the
inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" required the
"[w]ithdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the
recent conflict."2 In this Resolution, the Security Council also called
for the "[tiermination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect
for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and
political independence of every State in the area and their right to live
in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or
acts of force."2' The Security Council appeared to be calling for an
overall peace settlement between Israel and its Arab neighbors.
However, the Security Council left it unclear whether Israel was
obliged to withdraw only after settlement with its neighbors or whether
it was required to withdraw independently of such a settlement. 2 In
1980, the Security Council resolved that the forcible taking of territory
was unacceptable and "reaffirm[ed] the overriding necessity to end the
prolonged occupation of Arab Territories occupied by Israel since 1967,
including Jerusalem."2 ' The Security Council viewed Israel's
obligation to withdraw independently of other outstanding issues in the
region.2M4
The U.N. General Assembly, refusing to take a position in 1967 on
the initiation of the hostilities, has repeatedly and clearly called for an
unconditional Israeli withdrawal. For example, a 1983 General Assembly
resolution stated "that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible
under the Charter of the United Nations," and that "Israel must
197. Terry Atlas, U.S. Puts Stance in Writingfor Syrians, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 19, 1991, at A3.
198. Glenn Frankel, Two Nations, One Land; Decades of Distrust Split Arabs, Israelis, WASH.
PosT, Jan. 21, 1992, at Al; Daniel Williams, Shamir Ok's Plan to Integrate Israel and West Bank,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1991, at Al.
199. Williams, supra note 198, at Al.
200. S.C. Res. 242, supra note 2.
201. Id.
202. The Latin American states tried to formulate the resolution to require Israel to
withdraw unconditionally and independently of an overall Arab-Israeli settlement. The United
States, however, blocked the move by the Latin American states. BAILEY, supra note 69, at 112-
13; NEFF, supra note 70, at 345.
203. S.C. Res. 476, supra note 2.
204. Id.
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withdraw unconditionally from all the Palestinian and other Arab
territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem."2' The
U.N. has also condemned Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem2° and
its legislation designating Jerusalem as Israel's capital city. °7 It has
also declared Israel's legislation annexing the Golan Heights invalid.2'
Perhaps the sternest resolution adopted by the U.N. regarding Israel's
occupation is a General Assembly call for an end to economic and
military aid to Israel because such aid helps Israel maintain the
occupation. °
As illustrated by the U.N. action against Iraq, the U.N. Charter
contemplates stronger action than verbal calls for withdrawal when
territory is taken by force. Article 39 of the U.N. Charter states: "The
Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security."
210
These provisions of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter reflect the heart
of the dream that inspired the creation of the U.N. The Security Council
205. G.A. Res. 123(F), U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., at 39, '8, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1983).
206. S.C. Res. 267, U.N. SCOR at 3, U.N. Doc. S/INF/24/Rev.1 (1969); S.C. Res. 252, U.N.
SCOR, 23d Sess. at 9, U.N. Doc. S/INF/23/Rev.1 (1968); G.A. Res. 2253, U.N. GAOR, 5th
Emerg. Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/6798 (1967).
207. S.C. Res. 478, U.N. SCOR, 35th Sess. at 14, U.N. Doc. S/INF/36 (1981); G.A. Res.
35/169(E), U.N. GAOR, at 28, U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1981).
208. S.C. Res. 497, U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/INF/37 (1982) (the Council
"decides that the Israeli decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration in the
occupied Syrian Golan Heights is null and void and without international legal effect.").
209. G.A. Res. 180(D), U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp. No. 47, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/38/47
(1984); G.A. Res. 226, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 48, U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1982).
210. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. If a negotiated settlement cannot be achieved, Article 41
requires that the Security Council impose economic sanctions:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force
are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members
of the U.N. to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and
other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
Id. art. 41.
If these measures are insufficient to thwart the aggression, the U.N. Charter requires the
Security Council to take military action under Article 42, which provides:
Should the Security Council decide that measures provided for in Article 41 would
be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea,
or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by
air, sea, or land forces of Members of the U.N.
Id. art. 42.
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is charged to stop armed conflict wherever it might occur. While
Articles 41 and 42 use the permissive "may," it was contemplated that
the Council had an obligation to exercise its powers in the face of state
211 Caggression. The Charter gave the Security Council "primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.
S.212 Article 39 imposes an absolute obligation on the Security
Council, stating that it "shall" make a determination, where the peace
has been broken and it "shall" take action under Article 41, and Article
42 if necessary to restore the peace.
In the case of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the Security Council
immediately made a finding of aggression and called on the parties to
negotiate their differences in the hope that this might lead to an Iraqi
withdrawal.2"4 However, when Israel attacked its Arab neighbors, the
Security Council made no such finding of aggression and waited five
months to call on the parties to negotiate their differences.1 The
Security Council has moved beyond the call to negotiate by demanding
that Israel withdraw,21 6 but it has not yet moved to economic or
military sanctions to ensure Israeli compliance with this demand.217
In 1967, Israel's initial claim that Egypt attacked first gained sufficient
world-wide acceptance that the Security Council, ignorant of the facts
involving the Israeli attack, did not condemn Israel for its aggression.
Furthermore, after Prime Minister Eshkol acknowledged that Israel
struck first,218 Israel was still able to maintain sufficient acceptance of
the anticipatory self-defense claim to preclude a finding of aggression.
Even though Israel committed aggression,219 the Security Council has
not returned to the issue. From 1967 to the present, the Council has not
taken the Article 41 or Article 42 action that the Charter requires of it in
the face of an act of aggression.
The Security Council's inaction relating to the Israeli occupations has
given Israel time to establish itself in the Occupied Territories in a way
that has made it increasingly difficult for the Security Council to secure
an Israeli withdrawal. Israel installed over two hundred thousand of its
civilians as residents of the Occupied Territories." It took direct
211. LELAND GOODRIcH ET AL, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND
DOCUMENTS 293 (3d ed. 1969) (discussing Article 39); id. at 314 (discussing Article 42).
212. U.N. CHARTER art. 24(1).
213. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
214. S.C. Res. 660, supra note 5.
215. S.C. Res. 242, supra note 2.
216. S.C. Res. 476, supra note 2; S.C. Res. 242, supra note 2.
217. The U.N. must be careful to follow Charter procedures in any action it takes. See
Burns Weston, Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making: Precarious
Legitimacy, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 516 (1991).
218. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
220. See GEOFFREY ARONSON, CREATING FACTS: ISRAEL, PALESTINIANS AND THE WEST BANK
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control over half of the land area and bars the local Arab inhabitants
from its use3  It drained a substantial amount of the water supply
from under the West Bank for use inside Israel.' It dynamited or
sealed thousands of Arab homes as punishment for supporting the
Palestinian uprising in the Occupied Territories.' Further, by tightly
controlling the commercial activities in these areas, Israel drove large
numbers of young Arabs to emigrate in search of employment.'
Finally, by ruling through military edict, Israel deprives the inhabitants
of a role in their own governance.'
A. Action by the General Assembly
Avoiding potential United States vetoes in the Security Council, 1 6
the General Assembly took a number of steps to promote Israel's
withdrawal from the Occupied Territories. In 1974, the General
Assembly invited the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in
its work as an observer.' The Assembly established three agencies to
deal with the issue. In 1968 it set up the Special Committee to
Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the
Population of the Occupied Territories, which reported on the treatment
of the Arab populations in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.' In 1975,
it established the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of
the Palestinian People, to seek a political solution. 9  In 1977, the
Assembly created an office within the U.N. Secretariat to assist the latter
Committee - the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights, which was
upgraded in 1979 to the status of a division of the Secretariat."' In
1983, the General Assembly called for an international conference at
which Israel's withdrawal from the Occupied Territories would be
negotiated.32 However, Israel refused to participate, and the United
(1987); TREATMENT OF PALESTINIANS IN ISRAELI-OccUPIED WEST BANK AND GAZA: REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD 1977 MIDDLE EAST DELEGATION, passim (1978) [hereinafter REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD]; Richard A. Falk & Bums H. Weston, The Relevance of
International Law to Palestinian Rights in the West Bank and Gaza: In Legal Defense of the Intifada,
32 HARv. IT'L L. J. 129 (1991).





226. See infra notes 242-45 and accompanying text.
227. G.A. Res. 3237, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975).
228. G.A. Res. 2443, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1969).
229. G.A. Res. 3376, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1976).
230. G.A. Res. 40(B), U.N. GAOR, 32d Sess., Supp. No. 45, at 25, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1978).
231. G.A. Res. 65D, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 20, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1980).
232. G.A. Res. 58C, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., at 47, U.N. Doc. A/38/47 (1984); United States
and Israel Against Proposed Mideast Conference, Reuters, Sept. 19, 1984, available in LEXIS, Nexis
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States opposed such a conference.' The considerable efforts of the
General Assembly, therefore, have had little success in wresting
Occupied Territories from Israel.
B. United States Influence
The United States reacted differently to Israel's 1967 invasion than it
did to Iraq's 1990 invasion. In the case of the Iraqi invasion, President
Bush called firmly for the protection of the sovereignty of Kuwait.'
Bush further warned that "we must keep all our options open to ensure
that Iraq's unlawful occupation of Kuwait is ended and Kuwait's
legitimate government is restored."'
In 1967, the United States administration took quite a different
approach toward Israel. While Abba Eban told the Security Council that
Israel had been invaded by Egypt, the United States delegate sat silent,
even though the United States' administration was well aware that Israel
had initiated military action.' President Johnson was intimately
involved in seeking a compromise between Egypt and Israel and
followed the situation closely. 7  Similarly, when Israel changed its
version of the events of 1967 and sought to mitigate its responsibility
with claims of self-defense, the United States did not challenge that
analysis, even though the administration knew Israel's claims to be
false ee
During the few days that fighting continued, the Johnson
administration voted for the Security Council's call for a cease-fire,2 9
and pressured Israel to withdraw its troops from Syria.24' However,
once Israel consolidated its hold on the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip,
the West Bank, and the Golan Heights, the United States linked an Israeli
withdrawal with an overall Arab-Israeli peace settlement.241
The Soviet Union, on the contrary, sought an immediate Israeli
withdrawal without consideration of other issues. The approach taken
by the United States, which sought an overall settlement before
withdrawal, would have required lengthy negotiations. This led Soviet
Library, Majpap. File.
233. United States and Israel Against Proposed Mideast Conference, supra note 232.
234. President Bush, meeting with the Amir of Kuwait, said, "Kuwait, free Kuwait, will
endure." 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 14376 (Sept. 28, 1990).
235. Id. at 14377.
236. JOHNSON, supra note 78, at 296.
237. Id.
238. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
239. S.C. Res. 233, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/INF/22/Rev.2 (1968); S.C. Res.
234, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/INF/22/Rev.2 (1968); S.C. Res. 235, U.N. SCOR,
22d Sess. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/INF/22/Rev.2 (1968).
240. JOHNSON, supra note 78, at 296.
241. KIMCHE & BAWLY, supra note 67, at 271.
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prime minister Alexei Kosygin to accuse the United States of helping
Israel protect the fruits of its aggression by delay.242 In calling for an
Israeli withdrawal, Kosygin spoke in a fashion not unlike that of
President Bush following Iraq's occupation of Kuwait:
[t]here are many regions in the world where there are likely to be those
eager to seize foreign territories, where the principles of territorial
integrity and respect for the sovereignty of States are far from being
honoured. If Israel's claims are not rejected today, then tomorrow new
aggressors, large or small, may attempt to overrun the lands of other
peaceful countries.2
Kosygin claimed that "[t]erritorial conquests, if they were recognized
by various states, would lead only to new and perhaps even larger
conflicts and peace and security in the Middle East would remain
illusory."2  Kosygin tabled a Soviet draft resolution that, in terms
similar to those of the Security Council resolutions on Iraq, condemned
Israel's action as aggression and demanded both withdrawal and
reparation for damage caused by Israel.2'
The United States opposed the Soviet draft resolution, maintaining
its position that Israel should be asked to withdraw only in the context
of an overall Middle East peace settlement.2' The United States
explained its pro-linkage position on the grounds that achievement of an
overall settlement would be the only way to guarantee long-term peace
in the Middle East.247 In contrast, when the argument was made in
1990 that long-term peace could be assured only by resolving
outstanding differences between Kuwait and Iraq, the United States
insisted that Iraqi withdrawal was the only issue.'
In 1991, after military action was taken against Iraq, the United States
initiated a process for Palestinian-Israeli negotiations to address the
question of Israel's occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.249
If that process succeeds in securing an Israeli withdrawal, the Security
Council will be relieved of its obligation to secure a withdrawal. It will,
242. U.N. GAOR, 5th Emerg. Spec. Sess., supra note 190, at 5 (statement of Prime Minister
Kosygin, former Soviet Union); BAILEY, supra note 69, at 110.
243. U.N. GAOR, 5th Emerg. Spec. Sess., supra note 190, at 5, (statement of Prime Minister
Kosygin, former Soviet Union).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 6.
246. U.N. GAOR, 5th Emerg. Spec. Sess., 1527th plen. mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1527
(1967) (statement of Amb. Goldberg, U.S.A.).
247. Id. (statement of Amb. Goldberg of the United States, that a reversion to pre-June lines
would leave many underlying problems unresolved).
248. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
249. Thomas L. Friedman, Arabs & Israelis Invited to Begin Peace Talks, Oct. 30 with Bush &
Gorbachev, N.Y. TlMES, Oct. 19, 1991, at Al.
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of course, have been remiss for over two decades in carrying out its
duties under Chapter VII, and that failure has caused untold hardship
and loss of life and property.
However, if the United States-sponsored peace process does not
secure an Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories, the Security
Council will remain obligated by Article 39 to move to economic
sanctions first, and then, if necessary; to military sanctions under Article
42.?' International pressure is essential to secure an end to Israel's
occupation."' Israel is a small country heavily dependent on foreign
commerce for raw materials and foreign markets for its products and,
therefore, is an ideal target for economic sanctions. That being the case,
the likelihood of a need to move to Article 42 military sanctions is
remote. Effective international economic sanctions against Israel should
suffice to convince Israel to abandon the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and
the Golan Heights.
It was argued by one commentator, albeit prior to the U.N. action
against Iraq, that economic or military sanctions against Israel were not
feasible because they would not gain the necessary support from the
United States or Europe.52 To be sure, strong support from the United
States and Europe would be essential, but to argue that these states, as
a matter of practical politics, 3 are not likely to participate is not an
argument against the appropriateness of economic sanctions. Moreover,
whatever the posture may have been prior to the U.N. action against
Iraq, the use of sanctions in that situation puts pressure on states to do
the same in other comparable situations.
When it initiated a peace process in 1991, the United States
recognized the Security Council's role regarding the Occupied Territories.
250. See supra notes 210-12.
251. MALLUSON & MALLISON, supra note 2, at 420 ("[Tlhere will be no solution of the
Palestine problem until effective sanctions are applied to the Government of Israel."); Falk &
Weston, supra note 220, at 157 ("[Tihe moral clarity of the legal situation suggests the
appropriateness of mobilizing as much international pressure as possible to end the
circumstance of unlawful occupation and to encourage the proper fulfillment of Palestinian
claims of self-determination.").
252. Christopher C. Joyner, Book Review Essay, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 689, 708-09 (1987)
(reviewing W. THOMAS MALLISON & SALLY V. MALUSON, THE PALESTINE PROBLEM IN
INrERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER (1986)).
253. It is increasingly difficult to argue that practically speaking the United States is
unlikely to support economic sanctions. The United States administration has recently
questioned Israeli actions in the Arab Territories. The Bush administation has sought to add
a condition to its loan guarantees on behalf of Israel that such loans not be used in the
construction of Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories. See John M. Goshko, U.S. Details
Loan Plan for Israel; Offer Called 'Very Fair and Balanced,' WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 1992, at A23
(reporting that the Bush administation unconditionally offered Israel $300 million in loan
guarantees, but would not approve a further $10 billion request unless Israel agreed to freeze
the building of Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories).
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In a letter of assurances that it sent to the Palestinian delegation, the
United States Department of State wrote:
With regard to the role of the United Nations, the UN Secretary General
will send a representative to the conference as an observer. The co-
sponsors (the United States and the Soviet Union) will keep the
Secretary General apprised of the progress of the negotiations.
Agreements reached between the parties will be registered with the UN
Secretariat and reported to the Security Council, and the parties will
seek the Council's endorsement of such agreements. Since it is in the
interest of all parties for this process to succeed, while this process is
actively ongoing, the United States will not support a competing or
parallel process in the United Nations Security Council.'
By suggesting that the parties seek the endorsement of the Security
Council, the State Department acknowledged the Security Council's
responsibility to settle the dispute. By stating that it would not support
action in the Security Council while the peace process was on going, it
further recognized that the Security Council does have the power to take
measures aimed at securing an Israeli withdrawal. The thrust of the
paragraph was that the United States wanted to forestall attempts by the
Security Council to take an approach that was different from that to
which the parties themselves might agree.' Furthermore, the State
Department's posture on this point was consistent with U.N. Charter
Article 39, which requires attempts at negotiation between the parties as
the first step in resolving a breach of the peace.'
This contrasts strongly, however, with the United States' posture
following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Despite the Security Council's call
for negotiation in its initial resolution," the United States ignored the
possibility of negotiation between the parties, immediately moving to
unilateral economic sanctions against Iraq.
The Security Council could take as a starting point Resolution 242,
which calls on Israel to withdraw from the Arab Territories as part of a
package that includes ending the state of belligerency with neighboring
Arab states.' Such a package deal is politically feasible, as Arab states
254. United States Department of State, Letter of Assurances 2 (Oct. 18,1991) (on file with
author). See also Ghassan Bishara, U.S. Letters of Assurance Were Very Dfficult to Write, AL-FAJR,
Dec. 2, 1991, at 4 (reporting on the content of United States letters of assurance to the Palestine
Liberation Organization, assuring the PLO that while the United States would "work for serious
negotiations," the United States "took a stand against the U.N. dealing with the process while
the American-Soviet sponsored conference continues").
255. Letter of Assurances, supra note 254, at 2.
256. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
257. S.C. Res. 660, supra note 5.
258. U.S. State Deptartment, Regular Briefing, Fed. Info. Systems Corp., Aug. 14, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni file.
259. See supra notes 200-04
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appear willing to conclude peace agreements with Israel in the context
of Israel's withdrawal from the Arab Territories.2w
The major obstacle to international action aimed at an Israeli
withdrawal is the United States, which, since 1967, has stood in the way
of stronger action. If a draft resolution were proposed in the Security
Council to invoke Article 41 economic sanctions against Israel, the
United States, as a permanent member of the Security Council, would
have the power to cast a veto to defeat the measure.61 If that occurred,
the General Assembly could act on the matter, on the basis of its power
to "recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation,
regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare
or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from
a violation of the provisions... setting forth the purposes and principles
of the United Nations."' Refraining from the use of force against
other states is a "principle" of the U.N.
The General Assembly could act, more specifically, under the Uniting
for Peace Resolution, adopted during the Korean war." That
resolution authorizes the Assembly to recommend economic or military
action when the Security Council fails to address a breach of the peace
"because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members." s Any
action that the General Assembly might take under the Uniting for Peace
Resolution would be non binding, since the Assembly has no power to
require member states to follow its recommendations.' However,
concerted action by the world community to isolate Israel economically
would constitute community pressure that would be difficult for Israel
to ignore.
There is precedent for invoking the Uniting for Peace Resolution to
deal with this dispute. In June 1967, after the Security Council failed to
move beyond calls for a cease-fire, the former Soviet Union asked the
Secretary-General to convene a special session to take action to secure
Israel's withdrawal from the territories it had just seized. 67 Of all the
U.N. member states, only the United States, Israel, and Botswana
260. Anthony Goodman, Mubarak Tells U.N. Time Ripe for Palestinian-Israeli Dialogue,
Reuters, Sept. 29, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Archiv File.
261. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 3.
262. Id. art. 14.
263. Id. art. 2, para. 4.
264. Uniting for Peace Resolution, G.A. Res. 377A, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at
10, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
265. U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
266. Id. arts. 11, 13-14.
267. U.N. GAOR, 5th Emerg. Spec. Sess., Annex 1, Agenda Item 5 at 2, U.N. Doc. A/6717
(1967) (letter dated 13 June, 1967 from the representative of the former Soviet Union to the
Secretary-General, requesting special session "to consider the question of liquidating the
consequences of Israel's aggression against the Arab States and the immediate withdrawal of
Israeli troops behind the armistice lines").
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opposed the Soviet request for a special session.m Again, as in the
Security Council, the United States delegate sat silent. The General
Assembly, after two weeks of debate, failed to take any significant action
aimed at an Israeli withdrawal, perhaps in large part because most
members did not view Israel as the aggressor 69  If a request for a
meeting under the Uniting for Peace Resolution were to be made today,
it would be difficult to maintain that the Security Council was dealing
with the matter since the occupation has continued since 1967 without
any solution.
IV. CONCLUSION
Both Israel and Iraq made legal arguments to justify their military
actions in 1967 and 1990, respectively. Iraq at first asserted a claim only
to small parcels of territory near its border, claims for which it had a
legal basis. After seeing the reaction of the United States, Iraq
broadened its claim to one of sovereignty over the whole of Kuwait.
While Israel harbored a sovereignty claim to the Gaza Strip and the West
Bank, it did not assert a sovereignty claim over these territories at the
time of its invasion. Had Israel asserted its sovereignty over the Arab
territories as its justification for the attack, it would have gained little
support from the international communityY
However, Israel was successful in convincing the world of its self-
defense claim. Even after Israel acknowledged that it had lied about
Egypt attacking first, Israel still maintained general acceptance for its
anticipatory self-defense claim.
From a sovereignty standpoint, Iraq has a stronger claim to the
border area and the two islands than Israel does to the West Bank or to
the Gaza Strip. Yet the U.N. challenged Iraq much more swiftly than it
did Israel. The rapid action against Iraq reflected a double standard at
the U.N.'
The role of the United States in the two situations is the key.
Regarding Israel, the United States stands against any stronger action by
the world body to wrest the Arab Territories from Israel's control. The
268. 1967 U.N.Y.B. 191, U.N. Sales No. E.68.I.1.
269. NEFF, supra note 70, at 301-10.
270. In 1956, after it occupied the Gaza Strip, Israel asserted its intent to take over the Gaza
Strip. Evoking a negative international response. Israel withdrew within a few months
following United States threats to withdraw economic aid. Aide-m~moire on the Israel Position
on the Sharm el-Sheikh Area and the Gaza Strip, 11 U.N. GAOR at 5, U.N. Doc. A/3511 (1957);
Report by the Secretary.General in Pursuance of the Resolution of the General Assembly of 19 January
1957 (A/RES/453), part 2, para. 5(a), U.N. Doc. A/3512 (1957); DONALD NEFF, WARRIORs AT SUEZ
431-35 (1981); Aide-mimoire to Ambassador Abba Eban by Secretary John Foster Dulles, Feb. 11, 1957,
36 DEP'T ST. BULL. 392 (1957); Benny Morris, Creeping Withdrawal, JERUSALEM POST (int'l ed.),
Dec. 10, 1988, at 9.
271. Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 17.
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United States is an ally of Israel and its sole provider of financial aid.
Aware that Israel's action was aggressive, the United States participated
in the aggression by covering up for Israel in the Security Council.
However, given the action taken against Iraq, there is no principled
reason for the U.N to continue the go-slow approach to Israel's
occupation of Arab Territories. If the U.N. is to maintain credibility as
a body committed to international peace, it cannot sit idly by while
Israel's unlawful occupations continue.
